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and a cultural heritage. He does not get what he had
hoped for, namely, a categorical argument for saving
the family farm. But this does not seem necessary
anyway for reasons noted above.
The question of what we ought to do as a nation
seems to me to be more complex, however. Preservation
of the traditional family farm and rural life will require
the outlay of public funds; all are in agreement about
that. Decisions about the rightness or wrongness of
providing such funds must be made within the context
of shrinking economic and natural resources and of
other claims for the protection of many different kinds
of interests. Some of these interests are based on the
prior commitments of the government to serve the
population in certain ways, and other interests take the
form of claims concerning basic human rights. Family
farmers must make their claims about justice within an
ongoing social sphere that is populated, for instance,
by the inner city poor and homeless, the increasing
poverty of our children, high infant mortality, inequity
in health care and education, and the continued
mistreatment of animals and the environment. It may
well be that we should save family farms, but there will
be a price to pay in unmet needs of others. Thus, we
must have a clearer understanding of the interrelationship of these interests and of how to give them
just consideration. I think this precludes categorical
conclusions about the fate of the family farm but leaves
open the possibility for making good arguments about
how our institutions should be arranged to protect the
public interest and individual rights.
Notwithstanding my reservations noted above, I
recommend this book to those who are interested in
exploring these issues in some depth. No text or
anthology can encompass all views. Most of the essays
are clear, well-written, and accessible to even the novice.
I have no doubt that as a classroom text it will provoke
a large amount of useful debate and enlightenment.

Response:
The Rights of Animals
and Family Farmers
Gary Comstock
Iowa State University
It is a pleasure to be asked to comment on Kathryn
P. George's review, and not only because she so
insightfully criticizes the book I edited. Her review
provides me the additional opportunity to declare in
public that I have changed my mind about the respective
rights of animals and family farmers. As George points
out, I argue in my conclusion that you can defend
traditional family farms and animals. My reason is that,
even though the backbone of family farming is the
raising and slaughtering of food animals, smaller sized
"family" farms seem more likely than larger sized
"factory" farms to provide animals with humane care,
room to exercise, and quick, painless deaths.
Since finishing Famity Farm, I have come to believe
that humane care and slaughter are not the issues. The
issues are whether we harm animals with central nervous
systems when we kill them, and whether we have the
right to continue breeding mammals, with no other
purpose in mind than to carve them into steaks at a young
age. This is likely to be the issue of most concern to
readers of BTS, so I begin here, reserving for later my
comments on George's criticisms of my family farm
argument.
I have learned from feminists and narrativists the
value of first person stories in ethical discourse, and I
think it is important for ethicists to tell their stories,
especially when they have given up major parts of their
background beliefs. I have given up a major part of my
background beliefs, and I must tell you how it happened.
I was not motivated by professional considerations

Notes
I The definition of just what constitutes a "family-farm"
has been the center of contention, since many large corporate
farms, such as Cargill, are owned and operated by a family.
rn the "rntroduction," Comstock accepts Luther Tweeten's
definition with a modification noted here in italics: "a family
farm is an agricultural operation loved, worked, and owned
by a family or family corporation, with gross annual sales of
forty thousand dollars to two hundred thousand dollars. hiring
less than 1.5 person-years of labor" (p. xxv).
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alone when I began working on Family Farm.. It is
true that I thought Iowa State University, a land-grant
school in the middle of the U.S. heartland, needed
someone doing research on the topic, but I took up the
issue as much out of personal as academic reasons. As
readers of the book are told in the "Introduction," my
Uncle Harold and Aunt Sandy Pippert faced financial
difficulties on their farm in Cerro Gordo County, Iowa,
in the mid-1980's. The first Pippert farmers in that
county were my great-great-grandfather and great-greatgrandmother. That was around 1860. Around 1939,
my grandma and grandpa bought the 160 acres Harold
and Sandy now farm, and on which my brothers and
sister and cousins and I spent large chunks of our
childhood. The home place is dear to me. My wife
and children have taken a liking to it, too, and we
regularly visit there. Our favorite weekend activity is
to go to Nora Springs on Friday night to watch the high
school football game. This fall, my cousin Jason played
fullback and his sister Jenny led cheers from the sideline.
I tell you all of this to stress how much the Pippert
farm means to me. Our stories tell us about our background beliefs and about the narrative traditions in which
our ethical beliefs are formed. For me, the continued
existence of family farms is not an abstract problem in
applied ethics, and I cannot approach it with disembodied
principles or a utilitarian calculus. I care about the Pippert
farm, and I love my aunt and uncle and cousins.
The economic health of the Pippert farm rests on
the practice of raising and slaughtering animals. In the
summer, Uncle Harold,like his father, grandfather, and
great-grandfather before him, raises corn, soybeans,
oats, barley, and hay. Eighty percent or more of these
crops are converted into feed grains for cows and pigs
and chickens. All of the chickens are gone from the
farm now, and the handful of hogs and cattle that remain
are little more than Jason's last 4-H project before going
off to college. Nonetheless, Harold and Sandy's corn
crop is a money maker because it winds up in front of
animals at cattle feedlot, hog confinement, or broiler
hen operations.
When the book was published in February, 1988,
everyone on my side of the family ate meat, and so did
L None of us, I dare say, thought much about it. As I
began to think about it, I had a fleeting thought: to
reject meat might be equivalent to rejecting the history
and identity of the Pippert family. I say it was a fleeting
thought because I purposely put it out of my mind. I
thought it morally insensitive to waste my time
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exploring the rights of hogs and cattle at a time when
the economic pressures on hog and cattle raisers were
so severe. The playing field was so biased against
smaller farmers, and smaller farmers problems
produced so much anxiety, that I found myself
wondering what sort of person would ask questions
about the well-being of farm hogs when the well-being
of farm children was at stake.
After finishing the book, I gave the issue the attention
it deserves. I realized very quickly that the intentional
killing of hogs at six months of age, when the animals
might otherwise live for a period ten times that length,
calls for justification. I looked for philosophical
defenses of meat-eating, and found remarkably few.
Other than R. G. Frey, very few ethicists have taken it
upon themselves to defend meat-eating.! Reading Tom
Regan's The Case for AnirnalRightsconvinced me that
some mammals probably have mental lives roughly
analogous to some humans' mental lives, and that some
mammals are conscious beings with social lives much
like some humans' social lives. 2 I did not come to
believe nonhuman mammals are morally autonomous,
but I did not see why that fact should entitle us to kill
and eat them. 3 I did decide that a central issue is whether
a being has the potential to have interests, in the sense
of "able to take an interestin something." For if a being
potential1y has interests in this strong sense, it
potentially has the ability to take an interest in things
in its future. Having the potential to take an interest in
things in your future, it seems, should be all you need
to give others the duty not to kill you, in the absence of
good reasons to kill you.
Do cows and pigs and chickens have the potential
to take an interest in things in their future? I think this
is largely an unsettled empirical matter, and it calls for
psychological, neurological, and ethological study. I
cannot say that I know for certain what the answer will
be. But in the absence of an answer, it seems we ought
to err on the side of caution. That means not killing (or
breeding more of) cows and pigs and chickens unless
we have strong reasons to override our duty not to harm
individuals. Providing ourselves with protein is not a
strong reason, and neither is scientific research to find
out whether animals have future interests. We can get
plenty of protein from vegetable sources, and we can
live happy lives without vivisecting animals.
Thus I came to believe I ought to be a vegetarian.
As many readers of this journal know, to become a
vegetarian is much more difficult than to decide to
I

154

Summer 1991

Comstock: Response

imagining might render current "family" farms obsolete.
The likelihood is not great, but the possibility exists.
This leads me to George's reservations about the
way I qualify my final argument "from responsibility"
for family farms. George rightly points out that
arguments need not be "categorical" arguments in order
to be persuasive moral arguments. And yet it is equally
true that arguments that rest on highly contingent socioeconomic conditions will lack the force of arguments
that do not rest as heavily on variable social conditions.
Suppose that this year small family farms have a
comparative advantage over large factory farms because
of technologies of scale. Suppose that technologies and
world markets change and five years later the advantage
has switched to large farms. The socio-economic
conditions that support arguments about the superior
efficiency of family farms may change, and the next
year, family farms may not be as efficient as others.
Would we want to rest our claims for family farms on
grounds as variable as the grounds just mentioned?
Because the efficiency of family farms is the
weakest argument that can be made for preferring
family farms to factory farms, I searched for something
stronger on which to rest my case. If there are no
stronger grounds, then I see no reason to consider
asking nonfarm taxpayers to bear costs associated with
saving family farms. If, on the other hand, there are
much stronger grounds for saving family farms, such
as "These farms serve basic cultural, social, and
spiritual needs of the nation," then we may be justified
in asking taxpayers to bear short-term costs in order
to achieve long-term ends.
It was in the interest of finding the strongest moral
argument for family farms that I turned to arguments
from stewardship and cultural identity. I may, as
Kathryn George and Paul Thompson both suggest, make
too little out of these arguments. 5 But there are
weaknesses in both arguments, and my own argument
from responsibility tries to draw on the strengths of the
others, while avoiding the others' weaknesses.
On another point, George suggests the book needs a
discussion of moral theories, and again, she is right. I
had, however, to place certain limits on what could be
included, and I decided to include farmers' stories and
religious statements about the farm crisis rather than
philosophers' discussions of metaethics. While the latter
is readily available in textbooks, the former is not.
Even had I chosen to include more ethical theory, I
would not have thought to argue that family farmers

become a vegetarian. Slowly, over the course of several
years, with much opposition, and much support, from
various members of my family, I gave up meat and fish.
What finally pushed me over the edge was Tom Regan's
account of Barry Holstum Lopez's stories about wolves
planning ambushes of caribou.4 If wolves anticipate
the course of caribou several days hence, and devise
and follow plans to surprise their prey at a given point,
I can no longer believe that all nonhuman mammals
are unable to take an interest in things in their future.
Nor can I continue to think it ethically unproblematic
to raise and slaughter so-called food animals.
Professor George notices how briefly I discuss
animal rights in my conclusion. Kindly, she does not
charge me with the philosophical coward's way out,
begging the question. Unfortunately for me, the charge
sticks. I wrote only that proving animals have rights"
is very difficult to do" and tried to leave my reader with
the impression that animals do not have rights. George
calls me on the point.
But if I now believe pigs and cows have a right to
life, how do I square this belief with my continuing
love for family farms? Can you defend the rights of
animals and the rights of famil y farmers? To the extent
that family farms require the premature killing of
animals, the answer seems to be "no." But that answer
need not be read as a condemnation of the way of life
offamily farming, because farming is possible without
slaughtering animals. For most farmers in the Midwest,
raising animals, or raising feedgrains for animals, is
the largest part of the agricultural economy, and to
change this situation calls for radical adjustments. Yet
food animals are not the sum total of farming, even in
the Combelt, and there will be plenty left over for
farmers to do if one day there is no longer a market
for beef and pork. There will always be green beans,
broccoli, and sweet potatoes, apples, pears, and
oranges, filberts, almonds, and pecans to raise. A tofucooking, vegetarian America will need lots of soybean
and (sweet) com farmers.
That said, I must add that the possibility exists that
a vegetarian America might not need the current system
of medium sized, owner-operated, farms. Suppose that
efficient vegetable farming can be done on very large,
"factory" farms. Suppose, too, that these large vegetable
farms are owned by union workers who plant, weed,
rotate, and harvest crops in an ecologically sound
manner. An efficient and equitable and environmentally
sustainable farm system such as the one I am now
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have a moral right to demand support from land-grant
universities, or at least the right to demand that research
at such universities serve the needs of smaller farmers.
I find this an intriguing and promising idea, and I hope
George will have more to say about it.
A last thought, about the place of religion in secular
ethics. I made an effort to include in the book
contributions from various Christian thinkers. There
are various reasons for this choice, the strongest two
reasons being: the intimate historical connection
between Christianity and the development of this
country's rural areas and the recent appearance of
strong statements supporting family farms from
various church groups.
George apparently wants to exelude religion from
secular discussions of ethics, a desire not foreign to
many contemporary philosophers. It is not a desire I
share. Moral values in the West clearly derive
historically from religious traditions, and some moral
values are also grounded ontologically on religious
beliefs. I do not mean, of course, that all of ethics rests
on religion, nor do I want to defend Divine Command
theories. I mean only to acknowledge the rationality of
thinking about religious values, practices, beliefs, and
institutions as one thinks about applied ethics and public
policy. I mean to suggest that public discussion of
ethical matters would occasionally be strengthened by
careful, intellectually respectable, theological discourse.
I actually believe we have too little, not too much, public
God-talk, a situation obscured by the fact that the public
God-talk we do have comes almost exclusively from
Presidents of the United States and television
evangelists. If more politicians, academics, and
business folk were more forthcoming publicly about
the religious convictions they hold privately, their
religious and moral convictions would probably be more
rational. Public discourse about ethics would be more
enlightened and elevated. Toward this end, we continue
to seek contributions from representatives of various
religious traditions at the annual ethics conference at
Iowa State University.
Theology is not irrelevant to philosophical ethics or
public policy. George rightly points out that not
everyone agrees with the premises of theological
arguments, but that is no reason to rule theological
premises out of bounds. If we were to dismiss
arguments any time we could find people who disagreed
with the premises, ethical debate would be impossible.
And democracy would be in a far sorrier state than it is
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already. You may have serious objections to the
conclusions of the various statements of the U.S.
Catholic Bishops and the National Council of Churches,
and you may find the reasoning in the documents
abysmal. But that should not make you want to censor
such groups. It should make you want to educate them,
challenge them to do better. Philosophy is not about
excluding people from the conversation but, rather,
about continuing the conversation with everyone of
good will who wants to continue in it.
George helps me see how we might continue this
particular conversation in some fruitful directions. For
that, I thank her, again.

Notes
I R. G. Frey, Interests and RighJs: The Case Against
Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Rights, Killing,
and Suffering (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); "Autonomy
and the Value ofAnimal Life," The Monist 70 (January 1987):
49-63; and "Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and
Speciesism," Between the Species 4 (Summer 1988): 191-201.
Michael A. Fox, who once defended the widespread use of
animals in scientific research, has changed his mind.
2 Tom Regan, The Casefor Animal Rights (Berkeley: The
University of California Press, 1983).
3 I discuss this question in "The Moral Irrelevance of
Autonomy," forthcoming, this journal.
4 Regan, Animal Rights, p. 101. Regan refers to Lopez's
book OfWolves and Men (New York: Scribner's, 1978).

5 See Paul Thompson's review in Agriculture and Human
Values 6 (Fall 1989): 62-65.
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